

**PSYCHOANALYSIS FORMATIONS:
REDUNDANCY AND POETRY OF “OBJECTS”**

1. Psychoanalysis as civilisation’s symptom

La chose terrible est que l’analyse en elle-même est actuellement une plaie : je veux dire qu’elle est elle-même un symptôme social, la dernière forme de démence sociale qui ait été conçue.

Jacques Lacan, November 25, 1975,
Yale University, Law School Auditorium.

Psychoanalysis was created to deal with this *surplus* that remains beyond reason, following the repression (*refoulement*) of unreason established by Enlightenment's modern thought, foundation of our contemporary culture. A culture that propelled rational knowledge in spite of irrational thinking; irrationalism to be recovered by Romantic thought and its praise of dreams, just before the arrival of psychoanalysis. We should not forget that Freud began his study on mechanisms of the unconscious based on his work on dreams, since then, he considered to study those murky depths neglected by reason thought¹.

Only the poet Orpheus has been able to cross the *Acheronte*. However, when turning around to see if the repressed (*refoulé*) object was still there, Orpheus loses it forever. As the poet, so the analyst cannot allow him to speculate with the object, and hence builds his ethics. When the object emerges we cannot afford to repress (*refoulé*) it again. The accumulation of the repressed generates a capital surplus, a surplus of joy (*jouir*), something that psychoanalysis is supposed to handle due to psychoanalysts' knowledge-how (*savoir-faire*). This surplus of joy (*plus de jouir*), which Lacan derived from Marx, was to replace Freud's thermodynamic energy model.

The analysis' distinctiveness is determined by the fact that by addressing the symptom, both analyst and analysand pose the hypothesis of the unconscious; and the analyst, through transfer, supports the unconscious' unlocking.

Psychoanalysis, thus, would be a social symptom. “Psychoanalysis is the symptom of the

¹ “*Flectere si nequeo superos, acheronta movebo*”, Virgilio. Cited by Freud to introduce his “*Science of dreams*”.

moment (point du temps) we have reached in civilization”². Therefore, psychoanalysis was formed in response to an excessive accumulation of morality, so well described by Nietzsche little before Freud.

The opposition between conscious and unconscious phenomena is already present in the eighteenth century, within the writings of philosophers such as Leibniz, and will continue to be developed over the next century, notably by Eduard von Hartmann, author in 1869 of a *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, to be translated as *Philosophie de l'Inconscient* (Philosophy of the Unconscious). This constitutes the first appearance of the word in French used by Pierre Janet. In 1850, Carl Gustav Carus, Professor of Zoology at the University of Vienna, wrote a book called *Das Unbewusste*. He argued that animals know, but do not know they know. At the same period, Von Hartmann, a disciple of Schopenhauer, wrote his *Philosophy of the Unconscious* (1869) where he distinguished the unconscious in bodily life and the unconscious in the human mind, even if the human mind is primarily consciousness. From this strong current of ideas inspired by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, many theories came to defend the concept of the unconscious, notably E. Colson's *Études sur la vie subconsciente de l'esprit* (Studies on the life of the subconscious mind), 1880. As we thus can see, the hypothesis of the unconscious was born formally against rational thinking attempts to repress (*refouler*) its own shadow.

The idea of the “Super-Us” is presented by Johann Christian Friedrich August Heinroth (1773-1843). In his treatise on psychiatry (1881), Heinroth postulates the existence of the “super-us” – Über-uns –, which is probably an ancestor of the “superego”– the Freudian Über-ich. At times, he uses the word *bewusstlos* but seems to ignore the concept of the unconscious. However, he distinguishes three levels of consciousness (consciousness of the world, consciousness of the self and higher consciousness, or superego)³

2. The analyst 's formation

In order to name the various branches that psychoanalysis has tried to open as a training ground for apprentices in the psychology of the unconscious, Freud thought we should learn, to the largest possible extent, the science of sexual life and familiarize students with psychiatry's clinical

2 Lacan “D'un autre à l'Autre”: 1968-1969.

3 « La clé de la connaissance de l'essence de la vie psychique consciente réside dans la région de ce qui est inconscient. ». CARL GUSTAV CARUS: PSYCHE, 1846

pictures. They should learn to understand analysis by the only possible way it opens up to experience: by submitting themselves to analysis. These analysts were to be provided with the opportunity to observe live cases.

Moreover, analytical education should also consider matters foreign not only to the medical formation but also during the professional practice: “History of civilization, mythology, psychology of religions, literary history and criticism”⁴.

Years later, Lacan said, “We will gladly add, as for us : rhetoric, dialectic in the technical sense that this term is in the Topics of Aristotle, grammar, and advanced supreme aesthetics of language: poetics, which would include technical, left in the shadows of the joke”⁵. [*Nous y ajouterons volontiers, quant à nous: la rhétorique, la dialectique au sens technique que prend ce terme dans les Topiques d'Aristote, la grammaire, et, pointe suprême de l'esthétique du langage: la poétique, qui inclurait la technique, laissée dans l'ombre, du mot d'esprit.*]

To all this, we should also add the supervision benefacts, or should we rather say of super-audition: a formula that Lacan takes from Lévi-Strauss, when he says: “The sender receives from the receiver his own message in reverse form”⁶. [*L'émetteur reçoit du récepteur son propre message sous forme inversée.*] Double vision, stereo listening. Subject of enunciation and subject of utterance...

Freud, in his “Analysis with end and analysis without end”⁷, recommends analysts to realize their own psychoanalytical processes, periodically:

« Chaque analyste devrait périodiquement par exemple tous les cinq ans... ainsi l'analyse thérapeutique pratiquée sur le malade, cesserait d'être une tâche ayant une fin pour devenir une tâche sans fin »⁸

[*Every analyst should periodically for example every five years ... and therapeutic analysis performed on the patient, would cease to be a task with an end to become an endless task.*]

4 Sigmund Freud. Psicoanálisis y medicina. Paris: Gallimard, 1949. P.232-

5 Jacques Lacan“Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse”, p.286. Ecrits 1

6 Lacan, Jacques. *Ecrits*. Paris: Seuil, 1968.

7 Sigmund Freud. *Analyse avec fin* et *analyse sans fin*. 1937.

8 Op.Cit.

He says that the analyst, even analysis after analysis, “generally, does not reach in his own personality the degree of normality to which he would like his patients to achieve...”⁹

3. On the psychoanalytic revolution

When did psychoanalysis stop being revolutionary? How did Freudian ideas, so revolutionary in his earlier texts, become bourgeois; and readings his ideas by psychoanalysts today is just such as warming a cold dish which contains no more its flavour? Marx makes a distinction between the infinite the infinite gap between “life” and “consciousness”, the contradiction between “specific interests” and “general interests”. “To change life”, said Marx, phrase repeated by the surrealists with their “to change the world”. Breton and company were making a nice combination, putting at the same level Freud, Marx, and Rimbaud. Dali was for a long time Lacan's guide of critical paranoia's method. If for Lacan, Clérembault was his only psychiatry teacher, Dali would have been his teacher in psychoanalysis ... and poetry. The Surrealists knew how to deploy a “know-how” (*savoir-faire*) with psychoanalysis.

Artists are analysts on the move, experts *en acte*. They show us the edge between theory and practice that we should cross. Lacan used to put artists, mystics and researchers in the same rank, the same “know-pleasure” (*savoir jouir*) of the Other. Between speech and writing, *litturaterre* (literupture), language and speak-being (parlêtre)? “Motérialisme de lalangue” (Materiawordism of language)

If at some time the analysand becomes analyst, would there be the assumption of a desire, a desire which, as all desire, is the desire of the Other, of how he relates to the Other's pleasure? Dialectic between Praxis and Poiesis. The question about analysis “passe” and his end?

4. From object to abject

Toute création de l'art se situe dans ce cernement de ce qui reste irréductible dans ce savoir en tant que distingué de la jouissance, quelque chose pourtant vient marquer son entreprise, en tant qu'à jamais, dans le sujet, elle désigne ce qui est son inaptitude à sa pleine réalisation.

J. Lacan, “D'un autre à l'Autre”, p. 353

9 Op. cit.

In these reflections, the main concern remains the distance needed between object and subject, while passing through the filter of the “S <> a”¹⁰ fantasy (*fantasme*). Thus, for the analyst the placed question is: What should be done with this *surplus of joy* (*plus de jouir*) that accumulates because of the abstinence rule? How does the analyst place his objects “outside” the analysand, allowing him to undo the transfer's braids? Ferenczi, in his important work on “analytical elasticity”¹¹, spoke of the need for the analyst of “a special hygiene”.

Un problème, jusqu'ici non effleuré, sur lequel j'attire l'attention est celui d'une métapsychologie qui reste à faire des processus psychiques de l'analyste durant l'analyse. Sa balance libidinale montre un mouvement pendulaire qui la fait aller et venir entre une identification (amour de l'objet dans l'analyse) et un contrôle exercé sur soi, en tant qu'il est une action intellectuelle. Durant le travail prolongé de chaque jour, il ne peut du tout s'abandonner au plaisir d'épuiser librement son narcissisme et son égoïsme dans la réalité en général, mais seulement en imagination et pour de courts moments. Je ne doute pas qu'une charge aussi excessive, qui trouverait difficilement sa pareille dans la vie, n'exige tôt ou tard la mise au point d'une hygiène spéciale à l'analyste ¹².

The other, either analysand or analyst, must always remain an other for the other. Kant: “Always treat others as ends and never only as means”. Here are the ethics of transfer; instead of dreaming while awake, the new pathway to the unconscious.

In his text, about analytic elasticity Sandor Ferenczi proposes the ethics of not doing to others which, in similar circumstances, we would not want to be done to us.

The capitalist problem of the analysis arises when the analysand becomes the analyst's “surplus of pleasure”; when there is identification between the “a” object – “the abject”, as we call it – and the analysand. The question we would like to explore here is, what to do with this surplus of pleasure created by the transference relationship, and facilitated by the abstinence? Where are placed these two subjects and their respective “a”bjects, and what is the position and speed of this “surplus of pleasure”?

In order to be able to confront this, we believe the analyst should have other job as well, another know-how, a personal laboratory where to place his “abjects”. I am referring here to a

10 L'objet “a”... quelque chose...

11 S. Ferenczi (1928), *Élasticité de la technique analytique*, OC, Psychanalyse, t. IV : 1927-1933., Paris, Payot, 1982.

12 Cité in Jacques Lacan. Variantes de la cure type.

practice other than psychoanalysis, in order to place this surplus of pleasure somewhere beyond the analysand's future. But also, to avoid following the collapses when theory takes over cure, even if it is under the interpretation form or not: Freud simplifies when he maintains “prevents therapeutic killing science”. Here we find ourselves confronted to this analytical double edge between science and art. One written, the other spoken. Subject of enunciation and subject of utterance.

Here, then, the problem of state: the regarding the analytic institution that place itself as the “doctrine’s” guardian. That's the reason why I think Lacan said that the analyst authorizes himself only on himself [l'analyste ne s'autorise que de soi-même]. It is the problem of the *doxa*. Even the analytic “set”, according to Freud, only depended on the traits of every analyst's mind. In the analytical technique, there is no “one way”; Freud's technical works point out in that direction.

At the beginning of the cure , the analysand projects “the partner of his fantasy” (*le partenaire de son fantasme*) onto the analyst, and hopes to recover “something of the lost object” through him. To the analysand, the analyst occupies the place of a *resemblance of an “a” object* , of an object-cause of desire. How to understand this proposal by Lacan? This place of a resemblance of an object, how can the analyst become the owner of that which he knows he experiences, namely the dissolution of the subject supposed to know?¹³

This involves conceiving analysis as an intersubjective situation. The analyst's subjective involvement is presented as always tinged with passion, always in danger of succumbing to a particular method of seduction carried out by the transfer, always on the edge of technical foul....

5. On the end of the cure: Beyond the Pleasure Principle and before the surplus of joy

13 « *il est important de ponctuer que cette fin que je désigne comme la prise de l'analyste, de l'analyste en lui-même dans le forage du a, c'est très précisément cela qui constitue l'ininterprétable*”(Lacan *De l'autre à l'autre*, pag 351)

“*Si le passage à l'acte est dans la règle de l'analyse ce qu'il est demandé à celui qui y entre d'éviter, c'est justement pour privilégier cette place de l'acting out dont l'analyste à lui tout seul prend et garde la charge.*”

“*le bouc émissaire, celui qui prend sur soi cet objet a, celui qui fait qu'à tout jamais, pour le sujet, il peut y être sursis, celui qui fait que le fruit d'une analyse terminée, j'ai pu l'année dernière le désigner comme une vérité dont le sujet est dès lors incurable, précisément de ce qu'en ait été évacué un des termes. Comment ne pas voir que de là s'explique la position singulière que, dans le monde social, occupe cette communauté des psychanalystes, protégés par une association internationale pour la protection des scapegoats*” LACAN. *Op. cit.*

How can the analyst help the patient identify his *sinthome* (*sintomarte*). By facilitating the deconstruction of his identifications with his analyst? With all the economic factors at stake. The Other must reveal himself incomplete (barred by the signifier) and inconsistent (hole by the a object). Does the end of the analyst's treatment/therapy go with the end of his analysands own therapies/treatments?

This surplus of pleasure/joy, approached by equivocalness, moves among the plurality of meanings of the word “plus” in French.¹⁴ We shall never seek the subject to capitalise on this surplus of pleasure/joy, but to make it emerge in the form of an “a”bject, to put it as soon as possible into circulation on the symbolic chain.

This same surplus of pleasure/joy is facilitated by the analyst's renunciation of pleasure due to his conduction of the cure, as well as the subject's renunciation of pleasure because of the speech (*discours*), all of which allows the effectuation of the “a” object's function – an object missing, lost, cause of desire; an object, that during illness (psychotic, for example), remains attached to the body of the alienated.

“The subject's satisfaction is accomplished by everyone's satisfaction”, but this under the condition that it is associated to a human oeuvre¹⁵; it is this fundamental trait distinguishes it from perversion.

The surplus of joy appears then by the fact of speech; it is based on the renunciation of pleasure as a result of speech. Things are only things. Birth of representation. It is what gives its place to the “a” object. Fuel that permits to isolate the function from the object. Lacan replaces here the energy paradigm that has been used since Freud to conceive drive (*pulsion*) through Marx's theory of surplus value. Though the market defines as commodity any object whatsoever by human labor, that object carries in itself something else¹⁶. Excess and non necessity¹⁷.

From cure, we expect it allows to the subject the emergence of “a” objects, but what happens with the analyst's “a” objects?

14 C'est-à-dire à la fois comme manque à jouir et comme retour de jouissance, par le moyen du fantasme. CF. Alain VANIER, MOUVEMENTS DE L'OBJET. Mensuel de l'École de Psychanalyse des Forums du Champ lacanien, n° 18, Septembre 2006.

15 Vanier, Alain. Figures de la psychanalyse, N 20, P 82

16 « L'analysant ne termine qu'à faire de l'objet (a) le représentant de la représentation de son analyste. C'est donc autant que son deuil dure de l'objet(a) auquel il l'a enfin réduit, que le psychanalyste persiste à causer son désir : plutôt maniaco-dépressivement. » Lacan, *L'étourdit*.

17 Bataille, La part maudite.

$$a = 1/\phi^{18}$$

Just as the market¹⁹, analytic discourse will produce, will extract this **surplus** that replaces the missing original. A **surplus** that will be situated between knowledge and truth (vid. Lituraterre, “la lettre littoral entre savoir et jouissance”, Lacan), which at the beginning will make of the analyst its representative. He is the postman that carries out the promise of bringing the letter to the person who believed it forever lost. How can we change our position and allow the subject to bring us down from our place: by raising another object to the status of Thing, to the dignity of the thing. A dis-identification process necessary to the end of the analysis²⁰.

And what to do with the analyst's and the analysand's economic bond? Or, with the income that each analysand represents to the analyst's economy?

How is the fantasy's (*fantasme*) place articulated²¹? How will the crossing of the fantasme at the end of the analysis maintain and re-articulate the dialectics subject-object? Could the crossing of this barrier allow then to assemble subject and object in the creative process of the “a”bjects, as in Joyce and the creation of his ego? ²²

6. The analyst's position to facilitate the emergence of the “a”bject from the subject's pleonasm

18 Lacan, p.411, (D'un autre à l'autre) “La première formule indique que, dans son rapport à un autre signifiant S2, un signifiant S1 représente le sujet, S barré, qui jamais ne saura se saisir.

P:139 “De la plus-value au plus-de-jouir” J. Lacan

jouissance= “distribution du plaisir dans le corps”. P. 224

19 “Par ouverture du jeu de l’organisme, l’objet se trouve pouvoir prendre figure de ces entités évanouissantes dont j’ai déjà donné la liste, qui va du sein à la déjection, et de la voix au regard. Ce sont autant de fabrications du discours de la renonciation à la jouissance. Le ressort de cette fabrication est ceci – autour d’eux peut se produire le plus-de-jouir.” Op. Cit.

20« Le psychanalyste, donc induit le sujet, le névrosé en l’occasion, à s’engager sur le chemin où il l’invite à la rencontre d’un sujet supposé savoir, pour autant que cette incitation au savoir doive le mener à la vérité. Au terme de l’opération, il y a évacuation de l’objet a, en tant qu’il représente la béance de cette vérité rejetée, et c’est cet objet évacué que lui-même, va représenter, de son en-soi, si je puis dire. Autrement dit, l’analyste choisit, à devenir lui-même la fiction rejetée » . (Lacan, D'un autre à l'autre... op.cit.)

21 Lacan.“ La répétition du signifiant qui représente le sujet, S barré, par rapport à lui-même, est corrélatrice du « a » ici placé sous la barre. Inversement, le rapport du sujet et de l’objet prend de ce fait consistance en (Sbarré # a), où se produit quelque chose qui n’est plus ni sujet ni objet, mais qui s’appelle fantasme.”

22 Lacan, *Le sinthome*. Séminaire.

Faced with the symptom's redundancy, which insists on bringing the excess of a rainfall of signifiers, the analyst (as she/he was able to do with his/her own signifier redundancies) places himself/herself in such a way to allow the analysand to place this excess in the "a"object. This, so that he/she could enter into a dialectics of abjection, from the symptom's tautological processes towards the "a"bject's non-specular opening, at the ideal price of the transfer's liquidation. This new transfer, which may be called "abject's passion", will take over the transfer. The analyst is stripped of his place to allow the emergence of the object cause of desire. This, after having loosened the representations that prevent it and built the pertinent bridges. Construction and interpretation.

Things arise according to what is shown only from a privileged mode of language which is poetry²³.

7. Subject of utterance and of enunciation

"To authorize oneself on oneself" (*s'autoriser de soi-même*) does absolutely not mean "to authorize oneself by oneself" (*s'autoriser par soi-même*), a pleonasm, since the reflexive form of the verb implicitly supposes that the action's subject and object are the same. On the contrary, "s'autoriser de" is an expression specific to the French language and means "to build", "to invoke", "to be recommended by".

How to move from being subjects of enunciation, that we are in the analytic practice, to being "subjects of utterance", to which we refer on writing or creation? The question on the abject's appearance and the (our) ability to grasp it . The word (parole) of the speak-being (*parlêtre*), could it have the power to "volatilize the grasped" (interpretation) and the appearance of the abjects, i.e. to "materialize the volatile"(construction)?

Utterance is a *linguistic result*, i.e. the spoken word or the written text, while the enunciation is the *linguistic act* by which language elements are directed and made specifically meaningful by the speaker so to produce the so-called utterance: it is generally said that the utterance is that is "said", while the enunciation is the "saying".

To summarize, "it is the enunciation that makes the utterance". Utterance is material in

nature. Therefore, it is grasped by one of our five senses (usually hearing, in the case of orality; and sight, in the case of the written word), and also *reproducible (reproducible)* – first orally, then, in writing, and finally by modern technological means, such as analog or digital recording. Enunciation, however, is much less material and therefore much more difficult to identify and transcribe. Not always directly visible (*perceptible*), it can be the object of an investigation or a deduction, but it still always escapes us, at least partially. Consisting of an individual and unique act, “enunciation by nature cannot be reproduced”.

8. The analyst's art

We postulate the analyst's art as a support for the emergence of the “a”bject, from the pleonasm within the subject's constitution. Appearance that will allow the transfer to be concluded, and so accommodate the overabundance of meaning precipitation through poetic creation. The abject's non-specularity allows it to carry the double visage of utterance and enunciation, bringing at the end of analysis the possibility that analytic process becomes creative process, a transfer ever since between the subject and his/her “a”bject.

Could the analytical work consist on deploying a know-how with all the representations not represented, when phenomena of signifier excess seek to precipitate as letters?